seventeenth-quarterly-report.pdf

Seventeenth Quarterly Report of the Independent Monitor for the Oakland Police Department April 28, 2014 Page 29 two cases where PDRDs were not activated, one off-duty arrest, and four cases where officer conduct was sustained as a policy violation. In multiple cases, the conduct discovered was failure of the officer to activate his PDRD. In these cases, we found no evidence that a supervisor knew of the conduct prior to it being discovered. We also reviewed multiple investigations that were initiated after supervisors reviewed officers’ uses of force. In two such cases, the investigation resulted from supervisors’ review of PDRD recordings. In one case, the supervisor was reviewing the PDRD footage during a use of force investigation based on the deployment of the officer’s canine, and discovered that the officer attempted to stop a stolen vehicle that led to a crash and ultimate deployment of the canine. The sergeant found that the canine officer delayed in activating his PDRD, and also that the officer had prior sustained violations for the same conduct. Based on his discovery, an investigation was initiated. Due to the injuries that a canine can cause, it is necessary to ensure PDRD activation. In a second case, an officer had deployed his electronic control weapon, and did not make contact with the subject. During a review of the PDRD footage, the sergeant discovered that the electronic control weapon was deployed while the subject was running along a roof; and since the roof was an elevated area, the deployment violated policy. The supervisor initiated the IAD investigation. In both of these cases, the supervisors discovered the conduct, and initiated the investigations, ultimately leading to sustained findings. Other cases involved the off-duty arrest of a dispatcher for public intoxication, the discovery of possession of a controlled substance by an officer, allegations that a male officer acted inappropriately when having contact with a female civilian employee, and allegations that an officer was discourteous. In these cases, we found no evidence that a supervisor knew of the conduct prior to it being discovered. As we discussed with OPD during our last site visit, the investigation report’s member/employee accountability section should include an analysis of whether it was reasonable for a supervisor – through reviewing reports, investigating force, or supervising an officer – to identify misconduct. A transparent organization identifies – through close and effective supervision – any possible misconduct of its members. During this reporting period, the cases that we reviewed properly evaluated supervisors’ accountability. OPD is in compliance with this Task. Compliance Status: Phase 1: In compliance Phase 2: In compliance Case3:00-cv-04599-TEH Document979 Filed04/28/14 Page30 of 88