seventeenth-quarterly-report.pdf

Seventeenth Quarterly Report of the Independent Monitor for the Oakland Police Department April 28, 2014 Page 51 In our review of the 35 sustained findings, we found 12 in which an officer was equipped with an operational PDRD and should have activated it. In all of the 12 cases, OPD imposed discipline. Sanctions ranged from Counseling (one instance) and Written Reprimand (one instance) to Termination (two instances where other sustained findings dictated the outcome). In another case, an officer resigned; and in seven cases, officers were suspended for one or two days. There were no cases in which the failure to activate a PDRD went unaddressed. We commented in our last report that OPD was proposing MOR revisions to include addressing the failure to activate a PDRD in a new section that, if implemented, will carry more significant discipline than we have observed in the past. As of this reporting period, this and other revisions are still under review and being discussed with OPD employee unions. We will discuss these revisions further in our next report. Top OPD management has given attention to addressing the problem of failing to report misconduct. The Chief provided training regarding the NSA to two Police Service Technician academies, the four most recent recruit academies, and the recent lateral academy. Part of this training included instruction on the importance of – and the requirements for – reporting misconduct. The Chief also discussed this topic, in the context of remaining issues needed to satisfy compliance with the NSA, at the Continuing Professional Training (CPT) courses for both officers and sergeants during 2013. In March, the Chief will began speaking to the 2014 CPT classes. He plans to continue this discussion to reinforce the requirements. In August, according to OPD, IAD Command re-instructed IAD investigation personnel on Tasks 16 and 33. The training, initially proposed to be one hour, was extended beyond that timeframe as the instruction transcended into an open discussion. Since that time, OPD leaders report that they have observed that performance in these areas has improved. Confidential Reporting Task 33.3 requires that OPD must maintain a functioning procedure that incorporates the NSA requirements related to establishing and maintaining confidential reporting of misconduct. These requirements include: Task 33.3.1: confidential reports of suspected misconduct may be made in person, by telephone, or in writing (compliance standard: Yes/No); Task 33.3.2: any OPD member/employee may report suspected misconduct confidentially to the IAD Commander, who shall document the report in a confidential file that shall remain accessible only to this IAD Commander (compliance standard: Yes/No); Task 33.3.3: confidentially reported cases are investigated without disclosure of the complainant’s name, unless and until such disclosure is required by law (compliance standard: 95%); and Task 33.3.4: OPD informs all new and current employees of OPD’s confidential reporting procedures (compliance standard: 95%). As we have reported previously, OPD has established procedures as required by Tasks 33.3.1, 33.3.2, 33.3.3, and 33.3.4. Confidential reports of suspected misconduct may be made by various means to the IAD Commander; cases are investigated without identifying the Case3:00-cv-04599-TEH Document979 Filed04/28/14 Page52 of 88