fourteenth-report.pdf

Independent Monitoring Team Fourteenth Status Report of the Independent Monitor Delphine Allen, et al., v. City of Oakland, et al. July 31, 2009 to January 13, 2010 Page 97 number of instances, favoritism results not only in lax discipline but in officers not being sustained at all for misconduct (including serious misconduct) or having sustained findings overturned by OPD notwithstanding the strength of the objective evidence. Of the misconduct cases we reviewed for our most recent audit, there were 12 cases in which it appeared possible that inappropriate factors (such as favoritism, conflicts of interest, or political interference) played a role in the disciplinary process. These cases resulted in reduced discipline or no discipline and such result could not be explained by any discernable legitimate factors. These cases included a case involving two Internal Affairs intake officers sustained for running outside businesses while on duty at IAD. Each of these officers received the lowest level discipline possible (counseling and training) despite the significant aggravating factor that the misconduct was committed by officers assigned to the Internal Affairs Division. It also includes a case in which the City Administrator, without any written explanation, overturned the sustained finding regarding a commander and radically reduced the discipline. These cases also included an out of compliance pursuit case, an unlawful vehicle search case, and profanity cases that resulted in no discipline notwithstanding the facts of the cases and the officers’ histories. In several cases completed after the period covered by this audit, we continued to observe instances of inconsistent treatment that undermine OPD’s disciplinary system. In addition to the problems discussed above, we observed troubling inconsistencies in the manner in which OPD’s Skelly officers review sustained discipline cases. Officers and employees are entitled to a Skelly hearing in disciplinary cases resulting in punitive action involving a loss of pay. Absent a conflict of interest, OPD captains and deputy chiefs serve as the Department’s Skelly officers presiding over Skelly hearings. The hearings are intended to provide members and employees an opportunity to respond to the proposed discipline prior to its imposition. Many of OPD’s Skelly officers make decisions that are rationally related to the facts and circumstances of the cases they review. Other Skelly officers, however, have reduced the discipline automatically without regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. We have discussed this issue with OPD at length. It has agreed that its Skelly officers need additional training. The current IAD Commander also is trying to ameliorate the problem by not allowing certain commanders to act as Skelly officers. In order to address this issue, OPD should ensure that its Skelly officers understand and reinforce the values, mission, and integrity of the Department. Until factors such as political interference, favoritism, conflicts of interest, or other inappropriate factors play no role in OPD’s disciplinary process, the system will not function as intended and will do a disservice to the OPD members and employees. OPD is not in compliance with Task 45. This task will be actively monitored under the MOU. The Monitor will conduct the required audits, reviews or studies to assess whether OPD is complying with the substantive task requirements. (MOU, paragraph 10.)